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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This
Jacobsen

is a contract

action

to recover

$5,700 J. Douglas

("Jacobsen") loaned to Mollie Kimball

purchase a Fiat car in February, 1981.

("Kimball") to

The case was tried to the

Honorable Maurice D. Jones in the Fifth Circuit Court, State of
Utah, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department.

The trial court's

jurisdiction was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (1987), which
provides

circuit

courts with civil

claimed is less than $10,000.
Appeals
granting

is based

jurisdiction

if the sum

Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of

on Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (c)

the Court

appellate

jurisdiction

(1987)

over appeals from

circuit courts.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

What is the Utah Court of Appeals1 standard of review in

reviewing the trial court!s Findings of Fact?
2.
3.

Are the trial court's findings clearly erroneous?
Did the trial

court

properly limit consideration of

evidence of goods and services supplied to Jacobsen to the issue
of Jacobsen's intent with respect to the $5,700?
4.

Does the four-year statute of limitations bar Jacobsen1s

claim?
STATEMENT OF CASE
NATURE OF CASE
Jacobsen

filed

his Complaint
1

March

27, 1985.

Kimball

answered denying the loan, claiming the $5,700 was a gift, and
claiming the statute of limitations barred Jacobsen's claim.

The

matter was tried without a jury before the Honorable Maurice D.
Jones on September

23, 1986.

After

trial, the court wrote,

"(B)ased upon Mrs. Kimball's testimony on cross-examination, the
evidence

preponderates

in

favor

$5,700.00, interest and costs.
On November

of

the Plaintiff's

claim—

Judgment as prayed.11

28, 1986, the court entered Findings of Fact

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.

The Findings of Fact provide

as follows:
1.
$5,700

On February
for

her

8,

1981, Plaintiff

loaned Defendant

to purchase a 1979 Fiat

car

from

Wayne

Schilling.
2.

Defendant

told Plaintiff

that she would pay him

back the $5,700.
3.

Defendant told Plaintiff that when she sold her old

car, she would pay him the money from that sale and would
get the rest of the $5,700 to him as she made it.
4.

Defendant put an ad in the newspaper to sell her

old car and sold it within a couple of months.
5.

Based upon Defendant's own testimony, the evidence

preponderates in favor of Plaintiff's claim.
On December 5, 1986, Kimball filed a Motion For New Trial,
and a Motion To Stay Judgment and Amend Findings of Fact.

The

court denied Kimball's Motion For New Trial and Motion to Stay
Proceedings and Amend Findings of Fact, and amended its original
2

Judgment to provide for interest on the $5,700 from November 28,
1986.
Kimball filed her Notice of Appeal March 24, 1987.

The $300

cost bond required by Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals
has not yet been filed.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Loan or Gift Facts.

Jacobsen!s home was at 1050 Wood

Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 21, lines 15,16) where he lived
with his daughter, Sallee.

Kimball's home was at #475 Loren Von

Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah

(Tr. 34, line 15) where she lived

with her children (Tr. 38, lines 7,8).
On February 8, 1981, Kimball called Jacobsen at his home and
asked him to come up to her house and go look at a car. She had
seen the car advertised for sale in the newspaper (Tr. 21, lines
20-25).

Jacobsen drove to Kimball's house and they got in her

old Fiat and drove to Wayne Schillings1 place (Tr. 22. lines 67).

They looked at the car, drove the car, and left.

asked Kimball if she wanted the car.

Jacobsen

She said that she did not

have the money, and Jacobsen told Kimball that he could probably
loan her the money (Tr. 22, line 10).
They returned to Wayne Schilling's place and paid him $100
to hold

the car.

They

then drove

to Jacobsen's

home where

Jacobsen had his daughter, Sallee, write a $5,700 check payable
to Wayne

Schilling

(Tr. 22, line 15).

Jacobsen delivered the

check to Kimball as a loan (Tr. 26. lines 2-5).

They then drove

to Wayne Schilling's place and picked up the new Fiat and then
3

drove both Fiats back to Kimball's house (Tr. 22. lines 15-16).
Kimball told Jacobsen that she would sell the old Fiat and
apply the proceeds on the loan (Tr. 22, lines 23-25).
Kimball said: "I think when we first set up this, that I
would pay him for the car whatever I got out of the green (old
Fiat) car.

I may have made the statement that I would, when I

got more money, I would pay the rest of it . . .If (Tr. 52, lines
22-25 and Tr. 53., line 1).
Kimball also said: "I told him (Jacobsen) when I sold my
car, I would give him that money and that I would get the rest of
it to him as I made it."

(Tr. 53, lines 5-6.)

Expenses, Services and Property Facts.
Kimball were never married to each other.

Jacobsen and

Jacobsen did live with

Kimball when she would let him (Tr. 27, lines 2-20).

Jacobsen

worked for Buehner Construction Company and was often out of
town.

He was home on weekends for a day and a half a week

frequently during 1979 through 1985 (Tr. 27, lines 14-15).

He

was gone for three months while working on a project in California.
(a)

Expenses and Services

Kimball

paid the expenses on her house where she

resided with her children.

She had three children with her

part of the time and two children with her the other time.
She paid her house payment, utilities, upkeep and repair of
appliances.

Jacobsen paid the expenses on his house where

he resided with his daughter, Sallee.
4

He paid his house

payment, utilities, upkeep and repair of appliances.
Jacobsen did live at Kimball's house when home on weekends when she would let him.

Jacobsen did do physical work

around Kimball's house and did fix her cars.
(b)

Trailer Sale Proceeds
Jacobsen gave Kimball $8,000, money from a trailer he

sold, to put in an account for him when he needed it (Tr.
29, line 11).

It was a weekend, and he was heading out of

town at the time (Tr. 30., line 2 ) .

It was his money (Tr.

29, line 24). She returned it to him.
(c)

Bronze Statue
Jacobsen never did give a bronze statue to Kimball (Tr.

30, line 11). He did take it to her house and put it on her
piano.
(d)

Silver
Jacobsen was heading out of town.

his house.

There was nobody at

He asked Kimball to keep the silver for him (Tr.

30, line 11).

She said she would.

It was his silver (Tr.

51, line 8 ) . She returned it to him.
(e)

Boat
Kimball

lines

loaned her son $800 to buy a boat

18-20).

Later,

Kimball f s

problems and was selling the boat

son got

in

(Tr. 51,
financial

(Tr. 51, lines 22-23).

Jacobsen bought the boat for $400 (Tr. 51, line 25; Tr. 52,
line 2 ) .
Statute

of Limitation Facts.
5

On February 8, 1981,

Jacobsen told Kimball that he could probably loan her $5,700 to
buy a car (Tr. 22, line 10).
Jacobsen had his daughter,
payable

to Wayne Schilling

delivered
Kimball

Sallee, write a $5,700 check

(Tr. 22, line

the check to Kimball as a loan

told Jacpbsen she was obligated

15), and

Jacobsen

(Tr. 26. lines 2-5).
to give him the money

from the other car (when sold) and she told him she would (Tr.
40, line 22).

They then picked up the new Fiat and drove both

cars back to Kimball!s house (Tr. 22. lines 15-16).
Kimball told Jacobsen that she would sell the old Fiat and
apply the proceeds on the loan

(Tr. 22, lines 23-25).

In her

deposition and at trial, Kimball said: "I think when we first set
up this, that I would pay him for the car whatever I got out of
the green (old Fiat) car.

I may have made the statement that I

would, when I got more money, I would pay the rest of it . . . . "
(Tr. 52, lines 22-25 and Tr. 53., line 1.)
told him

Kimball also said: "I

(Jacobsen) when I sold my car, I would give him that

money and that I would get the rest of it to him as I made it."
(Tr. 53, lines 5-6.)
The old Fiat was sold in "two, two and one-half, maybe three
months" (Tr. 22, line 25).

Kimball put an ad in the newspaper

after she got the new Fiat.

She doesnft have a date on the sale

(Tr. 41, line 3 ) .

In Kimball's deposition, she said she put an

ad in the paper and tried to sell the old Fiat, within a couple
of months (Tr. 52, lines 15-17).

At trial, she guessed it would

be a month or less (Tr. 41, line 7 ) .
6

Kimball got $2,800 from the old Fiat sale (Tr. 40, line 25).
Jacobsen told her to put the money in an account (Tr. 22, line
25), and that "when I need it, I111 get it." (Tr. 23, line 1.)
Jacobsen told Kimball he would let her know when he needed it
(Tr. 28, line 2). Kimball told him she would put (the money) in
a special account, add to it, and pay him back (Tr. 24, lines 13).
Following Plaintiff Jacobsenfs presentation of its case in
chief, Defendant Kimball moved to dismiss on the basis of the
statute of limitations.

The trial court Judge, Maurice D. Jones,

denied the motion and stated that the evidence was that the
payments were to start at the time the old Fiat was sold, which
was after March 27, 1981 (Tr. 33, lines 12-16).
Jacobsen mentioned the matter to Kimball about once every
six months (Tr. 28, line 8). In August, 1981, Jacobsen, Kimball
and Jacobsenfs daughter, Sallee, were driving to a wedding
reception.
25).

Sallee asked Kimball about the money (Tr. 24, line

Kimball said that she "had it in a personal account and

that she would pay it back in one lump sum."
2.)

(Tr. 25, lines 1-

The money sat in the account and Jacobsen waited to be paid

(Tr. 25, line 6).

In 1983, Kimball told Jacobsen she wanted to

break off the relationship, and that as far as she was concerned,
hef d been compensated for the car (Tr. 43, lines 18-25).

She

severed the relationship in August, 1984 (Tr. 43, line 11).
Jacobsen filed his complaint to recover the $5,700 loan March 27,
1985.

Jacobsen has never received any payment on the $5,700 (Tr.
7

25, line 8)•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly found that Jacobsen loaned Kimball
$5,700. The court made five factual findings which supported its
conclusion that the $5,700 payment was a loan. There is substantial evidence

to support

the court's findings. Further, under

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),
not

be overturned

the court's rulings should

unless they are clearly erroneous. Specifi-

cally, the court's findings that Kimball's own testimony preponderates in favor of finding the payment a loan, and the court's
finding that the sale of Kimball's old car took place after March
27, 1981 were not clearly erroneous.
The court

properly

limited

the admissibility

of certain

testimony and evidence, and the statute of limitations is not a
bar. Payments on the loan were to start when Kimball sold the old
Fiat. The court properly found the sale took place after March
27,

1981. It was not until August,

1983, that

Jacobsen that she was not going to pay him back.

Kimball

told

He filed suit

March 27, 1985.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT OVERTURN THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT UNLESS THEY ARE
"CLEARLY ERRONEOUS."

This Court's review of a trial court's findings of fact is
governed

by Rule

52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987); Ashton v. Ashton,
8

733 P.2d 147, 149-50 (Utah 1987); Salt Lake City School District
v, Galbraith & Green, Inc., 740 P. 2d 284, 285 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).

Rule 52(a) was amended

effective January 1, 1987 to

provide as follows:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specifically and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant
to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for
findings are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.
The findings of a master to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated
orally and recorded in open court following the close
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum
of decision filed by the court . . . .
(Emphasis added)
Appellant Kimball's contention that a different standard of
review at present
Ashton,

applies

in equity

cases is erroneous.

In

the Utah Supreme Court noted that since July 1, 1985,

Article VIII of the Utah Constitution has not made a distinction
between equity cases and cases at law.
POINT II.

733 P.2d at 150 n.l.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

The Utah Supreme Court

has recently given

lower

courts

guidance in applying the Rule 52(a) "clearly erroneous" standard.
In State v. Walker, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 10-11 (Aug. 25, 1987),
9

the court notes that the language of Utah's Rule 52(a) is similar
to that

of

the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court

continues:
The definition of "clearly erroneous" in the federal
rules comes from United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948):
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when
although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.
Further clarification is offered by Wright & Miller:
The appellate court . . . does not consider
and weigh the evidence de novo.
The mere
fact that on the same evidence the appellate
court might have reached a different result
does not justify it in setting the findings
aside.
It may regard a finding as clearly
erroneous only if the finding is without
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law.
Thus, the content
standard, imported
if the findings .
the evidence, or
reaches a definite
has been made, the

of Rule 52(a)fs "clearly erroneous"
from the federal rule, requires that
. . are against the clear weight of
if the appellate court otherwise
and firm conviction that a mistake
findings . . . will be set aside.

Although we have applied the new Rule 52(a) since its
effective date, see, e.g., Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d
147 (Utah 1987); Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58 (Utah
1987), we have not examined the impact of drawing from
the federal rules in the promulgation of our new
Rule 52. Therefore, we disavow language in our earlier
cases describing or implying a standard under new Rule
52(a) which differs in any significant respect from the
standard of review applied in this case.
Id.

(Emphasis added)
In this case, the weight

court's

findings.

First,

of evidence supports the trial

the court
10

found

that

the

parties

intended the $5,700 payment as a loan.
supports this finding.

The weight of evidence

Four witnesses testified at trial.

The

clear testimony of three of the four, including Kimball herself,
was that the payment was not a gift, but a loan.

On direct

examination Kimball testified as follows:
Q. Did you make any suggestion to him [Jacobsen] that
you would pay it [the $5,700] back?
A. Yes. I told him I felt obligated to give him the
money from the other car, and I told him I would.
(Tr. at 40.)

Similarly, on cross-examination, Kimball testified

the payment was not a gift:
Q.
Do you also recall saying in your deposition,
quote, "I think when we first set up this, that I would
pay him for the car whatever I got out of the green
car. I may have made the statement that I would, when
I got more money, I would pay the rest of it, never
[sic] putting it into a special account11?
A.

I believe so.

There was a lot said about the car.

Q.
Do you recall me asking you, did you ever tell
Doug, Mr. Jacobsen, that you would pay him back the
5,700, and answering, "I told him when I told [sic] my
car, I would give him that money and that I would get
the rest of it to him as I made it."
A.

Yes.

I think so.

The testimony of Jacobsen and of Jacobsen!s daughter, Sallee, is
to the same effect.

For instance, on direct

examination,

Jacobsen testifies the payment was a loan:
Q.

—1981?

All right.

What next happened?

A. I drove up to her house and we got in her old Fiat
and we went down to Wayne (Shilling's, she drove the
11

car, or we both drove it, I mean, and then she—then we
left, and I said, do you want it or not, itfs a pretty
good deal. She goes, oh, I ain't got the money, and I
says, well I can probably loan you the money, and I
says, and then we headed out of Wayne, made a U-turn
when she said, yeah, I want it. We come back and wrote
Wayne a hundred dollar check to hold it for him until
we got back.
Q.

And then what did you do?

A. Went home, got the check from Sal lee, gave it to
Molly, went back to Wayne's, got the car, drove both
Fiats to her house.

Q.

Well, [what happened next] with regards to the car.

A.

To the car?

Q.

Un huh.

A. Well, she said the—the older Fiat, she'd sell it
for the payment on the newer one, and then when she did
sell it, she said that I—I sold the car, and I said
well, put it in an account and when I need it, I'll get
it.
(Tr. at 23-23).
preponderates

The trial court's finding that the evidence

in favor of Jacobsen's claim is not clearly

erroneous.
Second, the trial court found that Kimball's old car was
sold "within a couple of months" after the purchase of the new
car.

Similarly, in open court in ruling on Kimball's motion to

dismiss based on the statute of limitations, the trial court
found:

"The evidence at this point is that the payments were to

start at the time the other car was sold, that's the way I
understood the plaintiff's version of this, and so that would
take it beyond the March 27th date.
12

That is the ground upon

which I will deny your motion to dismiss."
not clearly erroneous.

These findings are

Jacobsen testified that the sale of

Kimball fs old car, the proceeds of which were to be the first
payment to Jacobsen, did not take place until some two to three
months after the February 8th $5,700 loan

(Tr. at 23-23).

Kimball testified that she guessed the sale could have taken
place within a month or less (Tr. at 41).

The court resolved

this conflicting testimony in favor of Jacobsen, and the court's
resolution is not clearly erroneous, especially considering Rule
52(a)'s direction that due regard be given the opportunity of the
trial judge to judge the credibility of witnesses.
POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED CONSIDERATION
OF EVIDENCE OF GOODS AND SERVICES SUPPLIED TO
JACOBSEN TO THE ISSUE OF JACOBSENfS INTENT
WITH RESPECT TO THE $5,700.

The court's limitation on the admission of "goods and
services evidence" is not in error for a number of reasons.
First, Kimball never formally offered the evidence for any
purpose other than "gift motivation."

At the beginning of the

trial, the court questioned Kimball with respect to the subject
evidence (Tr. at 7-8).

In that exchange, the court indicated a

tentative ruling, should Jacobsen object to the admission of the
evidence as "an offset."
introduce the evidence.

However, Kimball never attempted to so
Having failed to urge its admissability

as an offset at trial, Kimball cannot claim the court erred in
failing to consider the evidence on the question of offset.
Second, assuming the tentative exchange with the court was
13

sufficient

to properly

raise

the issue,

the court

properly

refused to consider the evidence on the question of offset.

In

Utah Dept. of Trans, v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah 1984),
the Utah Supreme Court noted that a trial court's rulings with
respect
absent

to the admission of evidence should not be overturned
abuse of discretion.

In this case, the trial

judge's

ground for limiting the admission of this evidence was Kimball's
failure

to plead offset as an affirmative defense.

While the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Utah Rules of Evidence
provide

liberal

standards

pleading

and proof,

there

for

the variance

between

is authority in Utah for excluding

evidence for failure to plead.
Construction

curing

See Youngren v. John W. Lloyd

Co. , 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985, 986-87

(Utah

1969); F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404
P.2d

670, 672

(Utah

1965).

In

this case, Kimball

made

no

attempt, at any time before, or after trial to amend her pleadings.

Nor were

there any special

justify such a failure.

circumstances which might

Under such circumstances, the court's

ruling cannot be considered an abuse of discretion.
Finally,

an error

excluded

went

only

to

rendered

to Jacobsen.

committed

was harmless.

the value

of

Kimball

the goods

The evidence
and

services

neither pled nor attempted

to

prove any liability for such goods and services, either by way of
contract

or

some

equitable

doctrine.

Kimball's

evidence,

therefore, was insufficient to have any legal effect.
Kimball commends to the court the case of Marvin v., Marvin,
14

557 P.2d

106,

134 Cal . Rptr,

815

(1976)

(enbanc),

for

its

analysis of property rights between parties who live together,
though unmarried.

Based on this case, Kimball urges her debt be

discharged on some subtle concept of fair division of property,
Marvin, however, rejects any division of property not based on
principles of express or implied contract, 557 P. 2d at 110, 116,
122-23, and Kimball has not pled such.
Kimball

attempts

to assert

Further, to the extent

causes of action based on express

contract, implied contract, or domestic relations, she should be
barred

for having

failed

to present

such claims below.

See

Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co. 723 P.2d 388, 392
(Utah 1980); General Appliance Corp. v. Haws, Inc., 30 Utah 2d
238, 516 P.2d 346, 348 (1973).
POINT IV.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR
JACOBSEN'S CLAIMS.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1987), civil actions may be
commenced only "after the cause of action has accrued . . .."
this

case,

the

trial

judge

found

that

Kimball's

In

repayment

obligation with respect to the loan was not to start until she
sold her car.

The judge further found that Kimball did not sell

her car until after March 27, 1981.
complaint

Under such circumstances, a

filed March 27, 1985 is within the statute of limita-

tions prescribed in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1987).
Kimball, however, contends that there was no agreement as to
the time of repayment.

To the extent the court finds there was

no such agreement, this case is controlled by 0fHair v. Kounalis,
23 Utah 2d 355, 463 P.2d

799

(1970).
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In that

case, 0'Hair

brought suit to recover the unpaid portions of a series of loans,
and the defendants pleaded the statute of limitations (§ 78-1225).

The

trial

court

Supreme Court reversed.

granted

summary

judgment and the Utah

The evidence, the court noted, revealed

the following:
According to plaintiff's version of the contract it was
the intention of the parties that repayment was to be
in the future.
Respondents emphasized that plaintiff
in her deposition states in one place that repayment
was to be in five or six years and in another that it
would be three, four, or five years; respondents
therefore conclude there is no way to determine when
repayment was to be made.
Id. at 800.
The court then quotes Grayson v. Crawford, 189 Okl. 546, 119
P. 2d 42, 45-46

(1941) for the following rule which the court

finds applicable to O'Hair:
[A] reasonable time for performance is allowed, when
the evidence indicates that the cause of action did not
accrue at the time the money was loaned, and the
parties, although they did not fix a definite date,
intended that payment was to be made at a future time.
Under such circumstances, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until a reasonable time has
elapsed. What is a reasonable time is a question to be
determined from consideration of all the facts and
circumstances in the case in which the question arises.
O'Hair, 463 P.2d at 800-01.
In this case, as in O'Hair, there is some uncertainty in the
evidence as to when the loan was to be repaid.

If the parties

did not fix a definite date for repayment, then a reasonable time
is allowed.

Jacobsen loaned Kimball the $5,700 on February 8th.
16

A reasonable time would certainly allow her at least two months
before her debt became due and payable.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should sustain Judge Maurice D. Jonesfs
judgment and findings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Z.2

day of September, 1987.

MI:

MARSDEN, OR^ON & CAHOON
Attorneys for Respondent
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